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FEDERAL COURTS-HABEAS CORPUS-Unconditional
Release From Custody Under a Misdemeanor Conviction
Does Not Render a Case Moot For Purposes of Habeas
Corpus and a Lower Federal Court's Declaration of the
Unconstitutionality of an Ordinance Is Not Binding Upon
State Courts.
On August 17, 1966, Reverend Richard Lawrence and a companion
were arrested in Chicago, charged with interfering with the duties of a
police officer under the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago.' The
activities leading to the arrest stemmed from a protest rally designed to
focus attention on the official conduct of one Officer Ginkle of the Chicago Police Department. The rally was staged outside of Officer Ginkle's home. Reverend Lawrence and his companion proceeded to Ginkle's porch and there knocked persistently upon the door. One Sergeant
O'Malley, assigned to protect the Ginkle family from harassment, requested that the two protestors leave the premises, forbidding them to
knock upon the door or ring the bell. Subsequently, after a second unheeded warning, they were arrested, charged with interfering with the
duties of a police officer under the aforementioned ordinance.
Lawrence was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, incurring a fine of $100. Since Lawrence claimed violations of
his constitutional rights, an appeal was taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
While this appeal was pending, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in an -unrelated declaratory judgment
action,2 held that the ordinance in question was void on its face as repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. In declaring that the ordinance was "vague and indefi1. Chicago, Ill. Municipal Code, Ch. 11, § 33, reads:
Any person who shall resist any officer of the police department in the discharge of his duties, or shall in any way interfere with or hinder or prevent
him from discharging his duty as such officer, or shall offer or endeavor to
do so, and who ever shall in any manner assist any person in the custody of
the police force to escape or attempt to escape from such custody, or attempt
to rescue any person in custody, shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor
more than one hundred dollars for each offense.
2. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill.
1968), appeal dismissed as moot,
410 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969).
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nite as well as over-broad," the District Court said that in failing to define the conduct which the ordinance proscribed, "[it] prohibit[ed] or
impinge[d] upon constitutionally protected freedoms."'
Although Lawrence had raised the issue of the constitutionality of the
ordinance on these very grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court, nonetheless, affirmed his conviction under that ordinance, without mentioning
the District Court's opinion in Landry in its decision.4 Rather, the Illinois court decided that "under a reasonable construction" the ordinance
could not be said to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The
court said: "An ordinance must be read in a sensible way. .. ." It
need not be "given an absurd effect which, although within its letter, is
contrary to its spirit." 5 Lawrence refused to pay the fine, and in lieu of
payment, was sentenced to jail for twenty days. He was then placed
in the custody of the Sheriff of Cook County.
Lawrence then appealed to the United States Supreme Court6 which
dismissed his appeal and, treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for a writ of certiorari, dismissed the petition.
Having thus exhausted his state remedies, Lawrence petitioned the
United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 7 This petition, being grounded upon the claim of unconstitutionality of the city
ordinance, was denied.
Lawrence then took an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." At the time this appeal was heard,
Lawrence had been unconditionally released from jail, having served his
full sentence. This being the case the court found itself presented with
two issues of consequence: first, whether an unconditional release from
custody under a misdemeanor conviction renders a case moot for purposes of habeas corpus; second, whether a lower federal court's declaration of the unconstitutionality of an ordinance is binding upon state
3. 280 F. Supp. 968, 973 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In Landry v. Daley, plaintiffs sought
declaratory judgments and injunctions against the enforcement of two city ordinances
and three state statutes. In Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill.1968), the
district court granted declaratory relief against the two city ordinances, including Ch.
11 § 33. See also Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968) and Landry v.
Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ill. 1968) for ad hoc injunctive relief following the

prospective injunction of March 18, 1968, enjoining prosecutions under the city ordinances.
4. City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 42 Ill. 2d 461, 248 N.E.2d 71 (1969).
5. Id. at 464, 248 N.E.2d at 73.
6. Lawrence v. City of Chicago, 396 U.S. 39 (1969).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948) requires that petitioner be "in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Further he must have
"exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State."
Exhaustion is not
deemed to exist "if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any
available procedure, the question presented."

8. U.S. ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970).
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courts.' Although holding that the case was not moot, the court denied Lawrence relief by deciding that the state courts are not bound to
follow the decisions of the lower federal courts on issues of federal law.
In deciding that the case was not moot, the court took steps towards
expanding federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners,
thereby increasing the power of the lower federal courts in questions of
federal law as that law relates to the states. Yet, in holding that the
state courts are not bound by lower federal court rulings regarding the
constitutionality of state or local enactments, and by saying that "as to
the laws of the United States [the state and federal courts] are coordinate courts,"' 10 the court put a limiting interpretation upon the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, consequently limiting the
binding power and importance of the lower federal courts in deciding
questions of federal law. This is an interesting dichotomy in that the
expanded habeas corpus jurisdiction gives evidence of the growing importance of the lower federal courts in the area of protection of federally
guaranteed rights. Yet, while acknowledging this in its holding on
mootness, the court ignored the trend in deciding the supremacy issue.
While the custody requirement" necessary for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus has been liberalized in recent years, and while
even the subsequent unconditional release of a prisoner petitioning for
habeas corpus has been held not to bar the issuance of the writ,' 2 the
cases allowing such issuance have depending in large part upon collateral consequences attending the challenged convictions-consequences
which impair the total freedom of the one convicted. Such consequences
are generally grave in nature affecting such fundamental rights as voting, the holding of specified jobs and offices, and the obtaining of
work.'

3

The first recognition that collateral legal consequences and civil
disabilities might overcome a finding of mootness was in the area of appellate jurisdiction. In St. Pierre v. United States,'4 the Court, while
9. As to the second issue the precise question was whether Landry was to be
heeded by the Illinois Supreme Court even though the Lawrence conviction had been
obtained prior to the Landry holding.
10. U.S. ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 1970).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, supra note 7.
12. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
13. All habeas corpus cases to date have dealt with felony convictions and the
consequences attending this more serious criminal category. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Scriberras v. U.S., 404 F.2d 247
(10th Cir. 1968); Brown v. Resor, 407 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1969); Sellers v. Smith,
412 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1969). However, appellate cases have dealt with misdemeanor
convictions and collateral legal consequences flowing therefrom: see Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
14. 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
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dismissing appellant's petition for writ of certiorari due to his having
been unconditionally released from jail prior to the hearing, seemed to
indicate that if St. Pierre had shown that the judgment affected his legal
rights in some significant way the case might have been decided on the
merits. St. Pierre did attempt to show that, were the judgment to
stand, his credibility as a witness might be impaired at some later time,
but this the court deemed a "moral stigma" of the judgment and not a
legal disability. But, while St. Pierre was often cited for its rule that
where the appellant has been released prior to the hearing of his appeal,
that appeal is moot, 15 it has also been cited for its exception to that rule
in cases of significant consequences affecting legal rights.
In Fiswick v. United States," the Court granted certiorari even though
the appellant had served his full sentence, because it was found that the
facts there brought the case within the St. Pierre exception; penalties and
disabilities existed which might impose legal hardships upon the appellant as a result of the judgment he had just satisfied. Being an alien,
Fiswick faced the likelihood of deportation. This likelihood was held
to be sufficient to establish the legal disability attending the conviction,
and it was not necessary for Fiswick to prove that such deportation
would as a matter of fact follow. Further disabilities flowing to Fiswick
were the fact that his naturalization might be impeded, his conviction
standing as a showing of poor moral character, and, last, and perhaps
most significant for later appellants, the Court acknowledged the everyday disabilities of a felon, disabilities which result in the loss of certain
civil rights. The Court, Justice Douglas as its spokesman, concluded
that "[i]n no practical sense, then, can the case be said to be moot."' 7
In Pollardv. United States,"1 the Court took steps toward a redefinition of collateral legal consequences. It held that, where an appellant
who has been unconditionally released appeals his conviction by challenging the legality of the sentence, the mere possibility of collateral
consequences attending the importance of a sentence will save the case
from a finding of mootness and will warrant a treatment of the merits.
No specific consequences or disabilities were spelled out by the Court,
which is particularly significant because here the challenge was not to
the question of guilt at all-rather, it dealt solely with the legality of the
sentence.
15. See Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943); Jacobs v. New York, 388
U.S. 431 (1967); Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U.S. 439 (1967).
16. 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
17. Id. at 221-22.
18. 352 U.S. 354 (1956).
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Although the mootness doctrine had seen expansion in the area of
appellate review, the changes were slower to come in the area of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, due in large part to the narrow
remedy which the courts felt habeas corpus afforded. Thus in Parker
v. Ellis,'" the Court in a per curiam opinion dismissed the petition for a
writ of certiorari which had earlier been granted to review dismissal of
petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, because petitioner
had been unconditionally released before the Court heard the case on
the merits. The Court concluded that the purpose of the habeas corpus
proceeding under the federal statute was to inquire into the legality of
the imprisonment, with the resultant and only relief authorized being a
discharge of the prisoner of his admission to bail. The Court held that,
for purposes of adjudiciation of a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner
must, at the time of that hearing, be in custody.
In dissenting to the Parker v. Ellis decision, Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan joined in an opinion which was to
foreshadow the new definition of habeas corpus both in terms of its
"custody" requirement and its grant of relief. The dissenting Justices
felt that the injustice reflected by the case was so conclusively shown
that the invalidity of the conviction should certainly have been proclaimed. They felt that "law and justice" required such a finding and,
further, that such a finding would be in keeping with "the spirit of the
writ." 20

The case of Jones v. Cunningham2 ' moved the newly-coined but latent definition of the Parker dissent one step into fruition by its holding
that a petitioner is "in custody" even though he has been released on parole before his habeas corpus petition has been heard. The basis for
this decision was recognition of the confinement to which a petitioner is
subject even though he is not imprisoned. Justice Black, writing for the
Court, stated that:
[C]ustody and control of the Parole Board involve significant restraints on petitioner's liberty because of his conviction and sentence, which are 22
in addition to those imposed by the State upon the
public generally.
While this decision was not as broad as those decisions involving cases
on appeal, it was a step toward recognizing that physical custody was not
the only restraint to which a man might be subjected. But the remedy
19.
20.
21.
22.

362 U.S. 574 (1960).
Id. at 582-83.
371 U.S. 236 (1962).
Id. at 242.
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afforded was not changed in form; the Virginia Parole Board was merely
substituted for the Superintendent of the Penitentiary as respondent, and
petitioner became a candidate for unconditional release.
The most significant case concerning habeas corpus and its custody
requirement was Carafas v. LaVallee21 which expressly overruled the
holding in Parker v. Ellis.2 4 Carafas, dealing with a felony conviction,
held that where the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed while
the petitioner was in custody, that petition did not become moot even
though petitioner was subsequently released unconditionally from custody prior to a hearing on the petition. Writing for the Court, Justice
Fortas concluded:
It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In consequence of
his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot
serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time;
he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these disabilities or burdens
[which] may flow from petitioner's conviction, he has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him. On
account of these 'collateral consequences,' the case is not moot. 25
Although the Court readily applied the collateral consequences doctrine as first enunciated in cases involving appellate review, it was not
apparently ready to hold that the collateral consequences themselves
were or created, custody. Rather, the Court held that:
[U]nder the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of
the petitioner
prior to completion of proceedings on such applica21
tion.
A further step was taken in Carafas to complete the new definition of
habeas corpus jurisdiction as originally articulated in the Parker v. Ellis
dissent. The relief to be granted was changed from mere release from
physical custody or custody of any kind,2 7 to "release from custody or
other remedy. ' 28 "[T]he habeas corpus statute seem[s] specifically
to contemplate the possibility of relief other than immediate release from
physical custody."2 9 Thus the Court deemed it appropriate that
courts "dispose of . . . matter[s] as law and justice require.""
23. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
24. 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
25. 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1967). The Court cited Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 633-34, n.2 (1968); Fiswick v. U.S., 329 U.S. 211, 222, n.10 (1946);
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954), all appellate jurisdiction cases
dealing with the mootness issue as affected by collateral consequences.
26. Id. at 238.
27. Cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
28. U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1964 ed. Supp. II).
29. 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1967).
30. id. at 239. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
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Having thus reached the decision in Carafasthat once a habeas corpus
petition has been filed a subsequent release will not destroy jurisdiction
where legal disabilities remain, a holding derived from this case dealing
with appellate jurisdiction, the focus turned from felony convictions
which are more easily conducive to a finding of collateral consequences,
to the more common misdemeanor convictions. As was the trend in the
felony area, the area of mootness in misdemeanor cases was initiated
at the appellate level.
The 1967 decisions of Jacobs v. New York"' and Tannenbaum v.
New York 2 reflect the treatment of a misdemeanor appeal in which
the appellant had been released from custody prior to the hearing of
the appeal. In those cases certiorari had been granted by the United
States Supreme Court but, due to appellants' release prior to hearing, the
petitions were dismissed. But again a dissent to the per curiam opinions foreshadowed the new doctrine to come. The dissenting opinion
was again that of Chief Justice Warren, who felt that the Court was
neglecting an "obligation" it had to decide constitutional questions in
the area of obscenity and First Amendment rights. He stated that the
Court should be "slow to accept mootness doctrines which grant the
states an unreviewable power to suppress expression. ' 33 He further
stated that "[where as here] a person has been convicted under a statute which limits his right of expression, his subsequent conduct will be
significantly chilled by the conviction on his record. '3
This latter
statement indicates that collateral consequences may attend misdemeanor convictions although those consequences were not spelled out.
Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Jacobs and Tannenbaum, wrote:
If those convicted cannot obtain ultimate review of such convictions,
merely because of the shortness of sentences and the slowness of the
judicial process, many will choose to comply with what may be an
invalid statute.3 "
Again in 1967 the Court spoke to the question of mootness, but this
time the majority reflected the Jacobs and Tannenbaum dissents. In
Sibron v. New York,16 a misdemeanor appeal which was heard long after appellant's unconditional release, the Court decided that the case was
not moot in light of previous cases which set the stage for this near-total
revision of the mootness doctrine. In recognizing the real need for
change in the misdemeanor area, the Court stated:
31.
32.
33.

388 U.S. 431 (1967).
388 U.S. 439 (1967).
388 U.S. 431, 434 (1967).

35.

id. at 437.

36.

392 U.S. 40 (1968).

34.

382
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Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered primarily at a level of 'low visibility' in the criminal process-in the
context of prosecutions for 'minor' offenses which carry only short
sentences. We do not believe that the Constitution contemplates
that people derived of constitutional rights at this level should be
left utterly remediless and defenseless against repetitions of unconstitutional conduct. A State may not cut off federal review of
whole classes of such cases by the simple expedient of a blanket denial of bail pending appeal.8 7
Further the Court enunciated what Pollard v. United States3" had
originally stated, that adverse legal consequences are presumed to exist.
In fact it was recognized that "most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences," 9 and Sibron extended that
Pollard holding to misdemeanor convictions.
And so the way was clear for the Seventh Circuit in Lawrence to follow
the precedent set by the forerunner cases in the criminal appeal area. It
determined that the collateral consequences attending even a misdemeanor conviction are significant enough to preserve the case for purposes of habeas corpus even though the petitioner has been unconditionally released prior to the hearing of the appeal. Just as the Supreme
Court based its holding in Carafas v. LaVallee4 0 upon the cases dealing
with mootness in the criminal appeal area, so the Lawrence court
adopted the rationale of the criminal appeal cases dealing with misdemeanor cases and the mootness doctrine.
Although Pollard v. United States4 ' and Sibron v. New York42 held
that it is presumed that collateral consequences will flow from criminal
convictions and, further, that there must be a showing that no disabilities will follow from the conviction before it will be dismissed as moot,
the Seventh Circuit noted that in fact Lawrence faced disabilities as a
result of his conviction. It cited an Illinois statute13 which allows one
charged with an ordinance violation or a misdemeanor, but subsequently
acquitted or released without conviction, to have his arrest record expunged. This statute is significant for two reasons: first, it will only
37.
38.

Id. at 52-53.
352 U.S. 354 (1957).

41.

352 U.S. 354 (1957).

39.
40.

392 U.S. 40, 55 (1967).
391 U.S. 234 (1968).

See also 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265 (1969).

42. 392 U.S. 40 (1967).
43. 11.Rev. Stats. Ch. 38, Sec. 206-5 which reads in pertinent part:
A person, not having previously been convicted of any criminal offense or
municipal ordinance violation, charged with a violation of a municipal ordinance or a misdemeanor if he was acquitted or released without being convicted, may petition the Chief Judge of the Circuit wherein the charge was
brought to have the record of arrest expunged from the official records of the
arresting authority.
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operate if the petitioner has not been previously convicted. Thus, it
may not only have the consequences of striking this conviction, the first
for Lawrence, but secondly, it may also serve to clear his legal slate so
that it may, at some future time, operate again in his favor.
When considering the essence of the Carafas holding as extended by
Lawrence, it becomes apparent that Chief Justice Warren's "time-is-ofthe-essence strait jacket"" is a concept more valid in misdemeanor cases
than in felony convictions. The complexities of the appellate process,
necessities to be contended with under the exhaustion of state remedies
doctrine, have a more harmful effect upon the appellate rights of persons convicted of misdemeanors due to the generally light sentences
which the misdemeanor clearly connotes. To hold that custody is a requirement at the time of the hearing of the habeas corpus appeal may in
fact deny review to a vast number of persons with viable and oftentimes
important constitutional issues to raise-issues which may touch more
frequently and immediately upon the rights of many citizens. It might
even be contended that requiring physical custody at the time of the filing of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus likewise cuts off the
rights of persons unconstitutionally convicted of misdemeanors because
the appellate process moves too slowly. Had the Court in Carafas considered the collateral consequences which deprive one of total freedom,
an equivalent of custody, even this barrier to federal review would have
been eliminated within the terminology of the statute. Thus the law
now appears to be that discharge pending direct appeal or appeal from
the denial of a habeas corpus petition will not render either case moot
regardless of whether the underlying conviction is for a felony or a misdemeanor.
Interestingly, the court in Lawrence concluded the portion of its opinion dealing with mootness by declaring that it saw "no reason why the
question of mootness should be treated any differently in habeas corpus proceedings from direct appeals." 45 However, after equating the
writ of habeas corpus with an appeal, the court then decided adversely
concerning the Illinois Supreme Court's duty to follow the lower federal court's holding of unconstitutionality under the theory that there is
no supremacy between the two sets of courts. It reasoned that the
lower federal courts have no appellate jurisdiction over the state courts
but, rather, both are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court.46
44.
45.
46.

Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 586 (1960), dissenting opinion.
432 F.2d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1075.
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In deciding the supremacy issue, the court wasn't able to base its
holding upon a federal case, there being none on the precise point. However, it is significant to note that it apparently did not look to the body of
law defining the role of the lower federal courts in an attempt to discern
whether any trend would point to a contrary result. Rather, the Court
of Appeals considered the state decisions on the point and with brief
analysis, but while pointing out that other state cases had held that federal decisions were binding upon state courts,4 7 the court adopted the
holding of State v. Coleman,4 8 concluding that state courts are not
bound by district court holdings.
This holding is consistent with the traditional doctrines of precedent.
Technically a court is bound only by the decisions of courts that have
appellate jurisdiction over it. Thus the Supreme Court decisions are
binding on the state courts because of its constitutionally granted power
of review over state court decisions. In a narrow sense this is not true of
the lower federal courts. Neither is the supremacy clause controlling
because while it declares federal law to be "the supreme law of the
land" it does not state that all federal courts have the power to finally
declare what the federal law on a question is. On a broader plane,
however, the decision fails to recognize the expanding power of the
lower federal courts in the area of habeas corpus.
It is the nature of the writ which permits expansion of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, as Justice Black pointed out in Jones v. Cunningham,419 where he stated that the writ is not a static remedy but one which
has grown over the years and continues to grow to protect individuals
and their rights. As the writ has increased in scope and importance, so
also has the court in which habeas corpus jurisdiction is vested-the federal court."0
As Professor Moore points out, 1 until the 1920's the function of the
writ of habeas corpus was mainly "to guarantee the use of all proper
legal processes, not to review the fairness of their application-thus assuring only a formalistic checklist freedom." Until that time the old
doctrine of comity, as set down in Ex Parte Royale, 2 precluded the fed47.

U.S. ex. rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (1970) citing Handy v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 Ala. 211, 160 So. 530 (1935), and Kuchenmeister
v. Los Angeles & S.L.R., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918). Although the rationale of
those cases is best briefly discussed they deal with federal statutes and the federal
court's right to decide such questions.
48. 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965).

49.
50.

371 U.S. 236 (1963).
See 21 Vand. L Rev. 949 (1968) for treatment of the ascendency of the lower

federal courts.
51. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrcE %0.230[2], at 2705 (2d ed. 1968).
52. 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886).
"The forebearance which courts of coordinate
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eral district court from looking to anything more than the simple question of whether the state court had proper jurisdiction to hear the matter,
and then only after a total exhaustion of state remedies. This rule was
formulated to prevent "unnecessary conflict between courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. '53 Thus,
until 1915 and the case of'Frank v. Mangum, 54 the decisions of state
courts hearing cases by way of writ of habeas corpus if the state court
was one of competent jurisdiction, and the only challenge available as
to the state finding of law and fact was by appeal.5 5
But Frank v. Mangum,56 while denying the petitioner relief from a conviction obtained in a mob-dominated atmosphere, did, by way of dicta,
indicate a weakening of the traditional theory. The Court decided that
in Frank's case there were still state remedies available whereby he
might overcome the defect in the trial which led to his conviction, but
also stated that had his state remedies been exhausted, the federal district court had the authority to look behind the trial record to conduct
its own factual hearing.5" But, while a federal court hearing a case by
writ of habeas corpus was seemingly granted authority to look to and
decide the case on the merits, the issuance of the writ was still granted
primarily upon the ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction.
However, the theory of jurisdiction was new; the state court, although
hearing a proper case, might be divested of its jurisdiction if an extraordinary constitutional error were committed.
In 1923, on the same factual basis which Frank had presented, the
Court in Moore v. Dempsey58 decided that the district court was bound
to determine whether the facts as presented by the petitioner were true
and, if true, whether they could be sufficiently explained so as to leave
the state proceedings undisturbed. Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, stated:
[I]f the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask-[at the
mercy of] public passion-and the state court fails to correct the
jurisdiction, administered under a single system, exercise towards each other, whereby
conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a
principle of comity, with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which comes from
concord; but between state courts and those of the United States it is something more.
It is a principle of right and of law, and, therefore, of necessity."
53. Id. at 252.
54. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
55. Cf. 21 Vand. L. Rev. 949 (1968) and 76 Harv. L. Rev. 483-84 (1963).
56. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
57. The case record in Frank would certainly have presented the appearance that
the court had jurisdiction and all guaranteed rights had been afforded the defendant.
The error alleged, mob-domination, was not one to be found in the state's record of
proceedings but rather was a factual question clearly going to the issue of due process.
58. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correction nor the
possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other way to
avoid an immediate outbreak of the mob, can prevent this Court
from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights. 59
While Dempsey was a clear mandate to the district courts to review
factual issues contained both within the trial record and without, this
was limited to the extent that the mob-domination allegation was one
so clearly contrary to due process that the rule seemed applicable only
in those extraordinary situations where the denial of due process was
flagrant.
The later decisions of Brown v. Allen 6° and Fay v. Noia6" clarified
the fact that the federal district courts when hearing state cases by way
of habeas corpus are in no way limited by the findings of fact or law
by the state courts. In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Frankfurter stated that the district courts might accept the fact finding of the
state court if, in the district judge's discretion, those facts adequately
present all relevant issues. However, the district judge is not bound by
the factual determination, and a hearing may be held to discover their
accuracy. The state court's conclusions of law and its adjudication
upon that law is not and cannot be binding upon the district court
since, "[i]t is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide."6
That opinion continued:
Although there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut
his eyes to the State consideration of such issues, no binding weight
is to be attached to the State determination. The congressional requirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be
deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
63
right.

Another issue was decided in Brown which also had a significant impact upon habeas corpus jurisdiction. That issue liberalized the exhaustion doctrine, perhaps the single most limiting feature of habeas
corpus jurisdiction. The Court stated definitively that a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court could be given no meaning
by a federal district court as regards the merits of the case at hand. 4
Thus the district court in Brown was held to be in error for having based
59.
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its denial of the writ of habeas corpus in part upon the significance of
the Court's denial of certiorari in the case. 65
Fay v. Noia finally rounded out the liberalization of the exhaustion
doctrine, holding that the habeas corpus petitioner need not have availed
himself of all state remedies in a timely fashion in order to be eligible
for the writ. Further, Noia held that it was not necessary for a state
prisoner to petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court in order to be considered to have exhausted his state remedies.
In summary, then, habeas corpus jurisdiction has been greatly expanded. As Justice Brennan expressed it in Fay v. Noia,66 "Although
in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty." It is no longer limited to questions of a state's jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding, nor even based upon such a fiction.
Rather, the hearing is addressed to the merits of the conviction and to
the question of whether there has been a deprivation of fundamental
liberty. Further, the writ is no longer discretionary. It is available to
any person who alleges facts, which if true would show that he is being
deprived of life or liberty without due process. It requires the court to
give the case prompt attention. 7
The exhaustion doctrine as applied to habeas corpus cases has seen
new dimensions and is no longer the rigid barrier to federal jurisdiction
which it once was. In addition, the Carafas holding concerning custody and the Lawrence addition to that holding in the area of misdemeanor cases have constituted a great step forward in increasing federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction. And, going hand-in-hand with the new
"custody" definition, is a new remedy in habeas cases, one which grants
to the lower federal court wide power to fashion relief other than immediate release from custody-"release or other remedy" as "law and
justice require." Thus, Lawrence has contributed to the expanded
habeascorpus jurisdiction of the federal district court.
Thus today in the field of habeas corpus, the lower federal courts
have the power to reverse any decision of a state court on questions
of federal constitutional law, whether factual or legal. The question
then becomes whether this power, so equivalent to appellate jurisdiction
over the state courts, could or should properly be deemed to be the
equivalent of appellate jurisdiction for purposes of the application of the
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doctrine of binding precedent. It is submitted that it should. However, two objections immediately arise. First, that this power is limited
to criminal cases and does not generally extend to civil areas. This
should however, not preclude its application in the criminal area at least
and may to some degree foreshadow its extension into the civil area.
The second objection is that one federal district judge is not bound by the
decisions of another. If this be true why should a state court be bound.
The simplest answer is that one federal district judge may not overrule
another as he may a state court criminal decision. On a broader plane
the power of review in the federal system to some degree insures similarity of decision at least within a circuit.
To some degree the question may be academic. In the vast majority of criminal cases, the power of federal review by habeas corpus
insures that its decisions on constitutional questions will ultimately prevail in a given case. In this connection it is interesting to note that
Lawrence never sought a decision from the federal court on the actual
constitutionality of the ordinance in question. If he had, the apparent
hardship of the decision might well have been avoided.
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